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Community Property 
and Family Law 
by Arthur M. Sammis* 
Important developments in community property and family 
law in California in 1967 were largely the result of legislative 
enactment, although several important decisions were ren-
dered by the appellate courts of California. Those cases and 
statutory revisions making significant changes in the law will 
be discussed here under appropriate headings. 
Orders for Support--Modification and Enforcement. 
In the past ten years, there have been more changes in 
the law governing payments for support and maintenance 
than in any other area of family law. Commencing in 1959, 
the legislature failed in only one general session, that of 1965, 
to enact amendments to Civil Code section 139. The statu-
tory amendments have attempted to deal with the difficulties 
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arising out of integrated agreements covering both property 
and support rights, where the provisions relating to the divi-
sion of property and those relating to support constitute recip-
rocal consideration. l 
Prior to 1959 in Plumer v. Superior Court2 and Puckett v. 
Puckett,3 provisions in agreements for child support were held 
subject to modification by way of increase only; the power to 
make a downward revision was denied. This limitation was 
removed by the 1959 amendment4 to Civil Code section 139, 
which expressly was made nonretroactive. Agreements pro-
viding for child support entered into after September 18, 1959, 
the effective date of the amendment, may be increased or 
decreased upon a proper showing. Although some doubt has 
been expressed,5 they would clearly seem to be enforceable 
by contempt.6 
A more complicated problem is presented in cases involving 
support provisions for one of the spouses rather than for 
children. In 1957, the California Supreme Court in Bradley 
v. Superior Courf held that such provisions contained in an 
integrated property settlement, although merged in an inter-
locutory or final decree of divorce, were unenforceable by 
contempt. As stated by the court, 
1. On the other hand, no problems 
arise where orders for support and 
maintenance are contained in decrees 
for divorce or separate maintenance, 
where such orders are not based upon 
agreement of the parties or, if made 
pursuant to such agreement, are predi-
cated on independent covenants. Such 
orders are modifiable, except as to ac-
crued amounts, and are enforceable by 
contempt. See Cal. Civ. Code § 139. 
2. 50 Cal.2d 631, 328 P.2d 193 
(1958). 
3. 21 Ca1.2d 833, 136 P.2d 1 (1943). 
4. Stats. 1959, ch. 1399, § 1, p. 3678. 
5. Report of State Bar Committee on 
1963 Conference Resolutions Nos. 22, 
40 and 61, July 30, 1964. See Synop-
114 CAL LAW 1967 
sis of Testimony Presented to the As-
sembly Interim Committee on Judiciary, 
September 30, 1964, in Santa Monica, 
California, at 20. 
6. The conclusion that despite the 
modifiability of post-1959 child-support 
provisions, the courts will deny con-
tempt on the basis of the contractual 
origin, is refuted by the reasoning of 
the court in Heller v. Heller, 230 Cal. 
App.2d 679, 41 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1964), 
upholding enforcement by contempt of 
modifiable spouse-support provisions in 
integrated agreements subject to the 
1961-1963 law under Civil Code sec-
tion 139. 
7. 48 Cal.2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 
(1957). 
2
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[P]ayments provided in a property settlement agree-
ment which are found to constitute an adjustment of 
property interests, rather than a severable provision for 
alimony, should be held to fall within the constitutional 
proscription against imprisonment for debt. That is, if 
the obligation sought to be enforced is contractual and 
negotiated, as distinguished from marital and imposed 
by law, even though the contract relates to marriage 
obligations, the remedy must be appropriate to the right 
asserted.s 
And in the absence of agreement by the parties, or express 
statutory authority, such provisions are also nonmodifiable. 
In 1961 further amendments to Civil Code section l39 
extended the power to modify or revoke to an order for sup-
port of the other party based upon a provision for such support 
in an integrated property settlement agreement,9 but limited 
this power to cases involving minor children of the parties. 
The 1961 amendments were repealed in 1963,10 and the 
repeal expressly was made nonretroactive. Integrated agree-
ments executed between the effective date of the 1961 amend-
ment, September 15, and the effective date of the 1963 
amendment, September 20, are therefore governed by the 
1961 legislation and are modifiable and enforceable by con-
tempt.ll Integrated agreements executed subsequent thereto 
and prior to November 8, 1967 are governed by the earlier 
law, are nonmodifiable, and fall within the proscription of 
Bradley. 
The 1967 amendments to Civil Code section 139 are 
sweeping. To the extent that they deal with provisions for 
child support, they simply clarify and restate existing law. 
To the extent that they deal with modification and enforcement 
of provisions for the support and maintenance of either spouse, 
they purport to be a direct answer to Bradley. The section, as 
amended, states that the provisions of any agreement for the 
support of either party shall be deemed separate and severable 
8. 48 Cal.2d at 522, 310 P.2d at 642. 11. Heller v. Heller, 230 Cal. App. 
9. Stats. 1961, ch. 2098, § 1, p. 4362. 2d 679, 41 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1964). 
10. Stats. 1963, ch. 861, § 1, p. 2097. 
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from the provisions relating to property. It further provides 
that all orders for support based on such agreements shall 
be deemed law-imposed and made under the power of the 
court to make such orders. Such support provisions shall be 
subject to subsequent modification or revocation by court 
order, except as to accrued amounts, and "except to the extent 
that any written agreement, or if there is no written agreement, 
any oral agreement entered into in open court between the 
parties, specifically provides to the contrary" ( emphasis 
added) . The amendment also provides that even where there 
has been an agreement, support orders may now be enforced 
by contempt, notwithstanding any agreements to the contrary. 
It has been stated that "amended Section 139 encompasses 
the finality advantage of the integrated property settlement 
agreement while providing the wife and child the contempt 
remedy in case of non-payment as well as the availability 
of new court support orders if the integrated agreement is 
discharged in bankruptcy.,,12 The last portion of this state-
ment is clearly correct; the new Civil Code section 139.1 
expressly grants the power to make appropriate orders for 
support and maintenance where such obligation has been dis-
charged in bankruptcy. However, at least some doubt exists 
whether the parties may have their cake and eat it too. Un-
doubtedly the California Legislature so intended, and it would 
seem clear that, to the extent that the support provisions are 
"severable," "law imposed" and "modifiable," the contractual 
and negotiated aspect to which the court referred in Bradley no 
longer exists. But the parties may contract against modifica-
tion and by their agreement limit the authority of the court 
in this respect. We may well ask whether an order for sup-
port made pursuant to an agreement of the parties, and by 
their agreement not subject to later modification, is truly 
"law imposed" and "made under the power of the court to 
make such orders." 
The new legislation is, with minor variations, that discussed 
by the State Bar Committee in 1964 and referred to interim 
12. C.E.B. REVIEW OF SELECTED 1967 
CODE LEGISLATION at 20 (1967). 
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committee of the Legislature for study in 1965. In its report, 
the State Bar Committee suggested that possibly a constitu-
tional amendment to article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt, might be 
necessary to meet the Bradley problem, but advised that legis-
lation be tried first. The legislation has now been enacted, 
and is expressly limited to agreements entered into after the 
effective date of the amendments. Some time will elapse, 
therefore, before its constitutionality may be tested. When 
that time comes, it may be of interest to counsel that Justice 
Schaur, who wrote the majority opinion in Bradley, and 
Justice Spence, who wrote the majority opinion in Plumer, 
are no longer on the bench, while Justice Traynor, who wrote 
strong dissents in both cases, is now Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of California. 
One additional 1967 amendment to Civil Code section 139 
should be noted. The third paragraph of this section now 
provides (except as may be otherwise agreed by the parties) 
for modification or revocation, upon petition of one of the 
parties, of any "decree or judgment granting any allowance 
to the other party upon proof that the wife is living with 
another man and holding herself out as his wife, although 
not married to such man. ." with like provision con-
cerning the husband living with another woman. The provi-
sion was enacted to negate the recent decision in Double v. 
Double13 wherein it was held that such conduct was, in the 
absence of a showing of other changed circumstances, insuffi-
cient justification for termination of an award of alimony to 
the erring former wife. It will be interesting to see whether 
the courts will hew to the literal provisions of the statute; an 
avowed mistress might still collect alimony from her former 
husband! 
Child Support 
The 1961 amendment to Civil Code section 139,14 which· 
broadened the power of the court in a divorce or separate 
13. 248 Cal. App.2d 650, 56 Cal. 14. Stats. 1961, ch. 2098, § 1, p. 
Rptr. 687 (1967). 4362. 
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maintenance action from that of merely providing for the 
"maintenance" of minor children to that of providing for 
"support, maintenance and education", was held in Franklin 
Life Insurance v. Kitchens15 to constitute a proper basis for 
sustaining that portion of a divorce decree requiring a parent 
to carry a life insurance policy for the benefit of minor children. 
The divorce decree, in dividing the community property, 
awarded a life insurance policy under which the wife was 
the beneficiary to the husband upon condition that his minor 
children should be named as beneficiaries until they reached 
majority. The husband failed to change the policy to accom-
modate this condition. In an action on his death, the insur-
ance company interpleaded the former wife as the named 
beneficiary and the children as claimants. The court, while 
finding that the children had no direct interest in the policy, 
held that they could enforce the provisions of the divorce 
decree against their mother, who was a party to the original 
action and bound by the order of the court. This decision 
is contrary to McKannay v. McKannal6 which had held 
that the court in a divorce action can only divide community 
property between the parties and cannot set up terms and 
conditions as to its use, and Miller v. Miller/7 in which the 
court, in reversing a decree requiring the father to keep life 
insurance in effect in favor of a minor child, held that the 
authority of the court in a divorce action to order child 
support was limited to an allowance of money and did not 
include the power to allocate specific property. 
While confirming the right of a first wife as a premarital 
creditor to levy for alimony and child-support payments due 
against the community property of a former husband's second 
marriage, the California Supreme Court in Weinberg v. Wein-
berg18 recognized that an apportionment of such obligations 
between separate and community income is appropriate. Dur-
ing his second marriage, the defendant husband used commu-
nity funds to pay both alimony and child support ordered 
15. 249 Cal. App.2d 623, 57 Cal. 17. 52 Cal. App.2d 443, 126 P.2d 
Rptr. 652 (1967). 357 (1942). 
16. 68 Cal. App. 701, 230 P. 214 18. 67 Cal.2d 567, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13, 
(1924). 432 P.2d 709 (1967). 
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in the decree terminating his first marriage; in the interlocu-
tory decree terminating his second venture in matrimony, the 
trial court held that he must reimburse the second community 
for the alimony payments but that child support was properly 
chargeable against the community estate. In reversing, the 
California Supreme Court noted that both are continuing obli-
gations based on both the separate and community income of 
the husband. However, the court determined that, although 
his earnings from separate property were sufficient to pay the 
obligations, an apportionment should be made on the basis 
of the total separate and community income (including all 
capital increases in his separate investments) during his sec-
ond marriage. Since both obligations are continuing, and 
are based in part on his community income, it would be in-
equitable to charge the whole of either, or the combined 
total, to separate income. 
In two cases, the responsibility of a mother to provide 
support for her children when the father has difficulty doing 
so has been strengthened, and in one of these, Smith v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Board,19 the mother's obligation 
is implied to be equal to that of the father. In that decision, 
the court agreed with the Appeals Board that the children of 
Jacqueline Louise McDonald were "totally dependent" upon 
her, even though they lived with and in the custody of their 
father who provided them with the basic necessities of life. 
However, the standard of living they enjoyed before their 
parents' divorce was maintained only by virtue of Mrs. Mc-
Donald's completely voluntary gifts and contributions, "and 
by virtue of these circumstances the mother was legally liable 
for support of her children . . . ."20 They were therefore 
entitled to certain workmen's compensation benefits upon 
her industrially caused death. In Levy v. Levi a father 
who suffered financial reverses was successful in his petition 
for assistance from the mother to help support their child, 
even though she did not have physical custody. The father's 
19. 245 Cal. App.2d 292, 53 Cal. 1. 245 Cal. App.2d 341, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 816 (1966). Rptr. 790 (1966). 
20. 245 Cal. App.2d at 295, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. at 822. 
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duty to support is not absolute, but "must depend upon the 
urgency of the needs of the child and the relative hardship 
to each parent in contributing to such needs.,,2 Mrs. Levy 
was required to contribute a substantial portion of her income 
to a child she had scarcely seen in years. Do these cases 
indicate a lessening of a father's responsibility to his children? 
Clearly not; however, if the father is having difficulty in meet-
ing his obligations, it seems likely that courts in the future 
will require the mother to assist, before allowing the children's 
needs to go unsatisfied. 
Paternity: Admissibility of Blood Tests 
An additional exception to the conclusive presumption of 
legitimacy set forth in section 621 of the Evidence Code 
appears to be the result of a recent decision of the California 
Supreme Court, Jackson v. Jackson. 3 That section, which 
restates without substantive change former section 1962.5 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides: "Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, the issue of a wife cohabiting with 
her husband, who is not impotent, is conclusively presumed 
to be legitimate." 
The "conclusive" presumption proved to be of little assist-
ance to Jackie Carol Jackson, who married Garland Jackson 
in Nevada on November 9, 1964. The parties returned to 
California to live and on the morning of November 13, less 
than four days after the marriage ceremony, Garland dis-
covered that his wife had left him. In his subsequent action 
for annulment, she denied that she had not intended to live 
with him at the time they were married and also alleged 
that she was pregnant with plaintiff's child. An order for 
support, prenatal care, hospital expenses, and counsel fees 
was entered, and a subsequent order, after the birth of the 
child, provided for child support and required compliance 
with the previous order with respect to counsel fees. The 
court also ordered plaintiff, defendant, and the child to submit 
to blood tests. The trial court thereafter refused to admit 
2. 245 Cal. App.2d at 359, 53 Cal. 3. 67 Ca1.2d 241, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649. 
Rptr. at 801. 430 P.2d 289 (1967). 
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into evidence the results of the blood tests, which demon-
strated that the plaintiff could not have fathered the child, 
and denied plaintiff's motion to terminate all prior court orders 
for support, doctor and medical expenses. Upon plaintiff's 
appeal the Supreme Court reversed, the majority holding 
that the ruling of the trial court denied plaintiff a fair oppor-
tunity to prove that defendant's child was not conceived 
during the short period the couple cohabited. In a four-to-
three decision, with Justices Burke, Tobriner and Sullivan 
dissenting, the court distinguished the case from its decision 
in Kusior v. Silver4 on the ground that the earlier case was 
based primarily on the erroneous definition of "cohabiting" 
by the trial court. On the other hand, the majority opinion 
reiterates the statement in Kusior that the statutory presump-
tion of legitimacy is not so much a conclusive presumption 
as a substantive rule of law that a husband will be treated as 
the father of a child born to his wife and conceived while 
they were cohabiting. Ergo, he must be given the chance 
to prove that he is not the legal father by demonstrating the 
impossibility that the child was conceived during cohabitation 
with his wife. The statute does not refer to "conception 
during cohabitation" but conclusively presumes that it oc-
curred; the court has judicially amended the section to permit 
proof to the contrary. No matter how the majority may put it, 
the end result of the opinion is to add one additional method, 
based on blood-test evidence, of avoiding the operation of 
the presumption. It is "conclusive" only if the fact which it 
conclusively determines to be true is not shown to be impos-
sible, and the manner of proof of impossibility is being con-
stantly broadened.5 
Quasi.Community Property 
Brief mention should be made of the decision in the Estate 
of Rogers6 upholding the constitutionality of section 13672 
4. 54 Cal. 2d 603, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, Cal. App.2d 422, 325 P.2d 538 (1958); 
354 P.2d 657 (1960). or is sterile, Hughes v. Hughes, 125 
5. The conclusive presumption also Cal. App.2d 781, 271 P.2d 172 (1954). 
does not apply when the husband had 6. 245 Cal. App.2d 101, 53 Cal. 
no access to his wife during the time Rptr. 572 (1966). 
of conception, Madden v. Madden, 160 
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of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The section treats, for 
inheritance tax purposes, joint-tenancy property having its 
source in quasi-community property7 as if one-half of the 
consideration for the acquisition of such property were fur-
nished by each spouse, as opposed to section 13671.5, which 
provides that if husband and wife place community property 
in their joint names, the joint tenancy shall be treated as if 
it were community property. The superior court found that 
the statute violated not only the equal protection clause of 
the United States Constitution, but also violated provisions 
of the California Constitution.s In reversing, the Court of 
Appeal, in a divided opinion, pointed out that quasi-commu-
nity property has become sui generis; it is not community 
property, but neither is it like other separate property, because 
it is burdened with both the wife's expectancy in the event 
of the husband's death and her contingent rights in the event 
of a divorce or decree of separate maintenance. There is, 
therefore, reason for permitting a legislative classification, and 
the statute is constitutionaV 
National Service Life Insurance Policies and the Wissner Rule 
In Thoen v. Thoen1o plaintiff's former husband, following 
his remarriage, changed the beneficiary of his National Service 
Life Insurance Policyll from plaintiff to his second wife. 
The change was made in violation of the provisions of the 
divorce decree awarding all of the community property to 
plaintiff and enjoining the husband from changing the benefi-
ciary or otherwise altering the terms and conditions of the 
policy. The policy was community property of the parties. 
Upon death of the husband, defendant, his second wife, re-
ceived the proceeds of the policy and plaintiff sued to establish 
a constructive trust. Plaintiff relied on two cases involving 
7. That is, property acquired outside 
of the state which would have been 
community property if acquired in Cali-
fornia. See Cal. Civ. Code § 140.5. 
8. Cal. Const. art. I, §§ 11 and 21; 
art. IV, §§ 25(10) and 25(33). 
9. For analysis critical to the court's 
solution of the constitutional issue, see 
122 CAL LAW 1967 
Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW in this 
volume. 
10. 248 Cal. App.2d 354, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 614 (1967). 
11. An N.S.L.I. policy is a low-cost 
life insurance policy made available to 
servicemen by the teQeral ~overnJ,I1ent, 
10
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a conflict between local community property laws and federal 
laws. Both Free v. Bland12 and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos13 recog-
nized that the survivorship provisions, allowing beneficiaries 
to be designated at will, in the United States Savings Bonds 
should not "become a sanctuary for wrongdoers' gains»l4 
and that relief should be available where there appears to 
have been "fraud or a breach of trust tantamount thereto on 
the part of the husband while acting in his capacity as man-
ager of the general community property".15 The Court of 
Appeal, in affirming a judgment of dismissal, distinguished 
between the strong federal policy announced in the earlier 
case of Wissner v. Wissner16 (upholding the supremacy of the 
federal statute in the N.S.L.I. situation) and the regulations 
governing savings bonds, and pointed out that this distinction 
had been noted in Free v. Bland. The Wissner case controls, 
and relief by way of constructive trust is not available. 
Annulment 
In Whealton v. Whealton17 the husband, a chief petty officer 
on active duty with the United States Navy, instituted an 
action for annulment in California against his wife whom 
he had married in Maryland and who was still a domiciliary 
of and resided in that state. Upon service by publication, 
he was awarded a default judgment. The court held the orig-
inal judgment to be void. The theory of ex parte jurisdiction 
in an annulment cannot rely on the concept of a res or status 
found within the state, as in the case of divorce actions; how-
ever, the courts have recognized a state's interest in providing 
a forum for some annulment actions even though the court 
12. 369 U.S. 663, 8 L.ed.2d 180, 82 
S.Ct. 1089 (1962). 
13. 376 u.s. 306, 11 L.ed.2d 724, 84 
S.Ct. 742 (1964). 
14. 369 u.s. at 671, n. 12, 8 L.ed.2d 
at 186, 82 S.Ct. at 1094. Brief for the 
United States as amicus curiae at 21. 
15. 369 U.S. at 670,8 L.ed.2d at 186, 
82 S.Ct. at 1094. Plaintiff does not ap-
pear to have cited the California case 
of Estate of Bray, 230 Cal. App.2d 136, 
40 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1964), applying the 
two United States Supreme Court deci-
sions and requiring an accounting as to 
one-half of U. S. savings bonds improp-
erly registered in the joint names of the 
husband and a third party. 
16. 338 U.S. 655, 94 L.ed. 424, 70 S. 
Ct. 398 (1950). 
17. 67 Cal.2d 667, 63 Cal. Rptr. 291, 
432 P.2d 979 (1967). 
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lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the parties. The 
primary issue under the facts in this case was whether due 
process concepts of fairness to a defendant permit a plaintiff 
to chose a forum inconvenient to the defendant when personal 
jurisdiction has not been obtained. Although the domicile 
of plaintiff would afford jurisdiction to award an ex parte 
annulment, he neither pleaded nor proved domicile in Cali-
fornia; the marriage took place elsewhere, the matrimonial 
domicile was elsewhere, and defendant lived elsewhere. "The 
court was therefore without jurisdiction to enter the default 
judgment."18 However, after the entry of judgment, the wife 
appeared generally in the action. May the court, on re-trial, 
award an annulment when both parties are before it, even 
though neither is a domiciliary of the state? Yes. As stated 
by the court, ". . . the interests of the state of celebration 
of the marriage or the state of domicile of either party do not 
preclude a court that has personal jurisdiction over both par-
ties from entertaining an annulment action."19 Must the court 
then exercise this jurisdiction in all cases? No. 
"In other annulment actions, where personal jurisdic-
tion is the sole jurisdictional basis, . . . the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens might well be invoked by one 
of the parties or asserted by the court, to cause a dis-
cretionary dismissal when fairness and the interests of 
judicial administration so demand.,,20 
As a result, except for saying that where neither party is a 
domiciliary and personal jurisdiction exists as to one only, 
the court lacks jurisdiction, the opinion fails to lay down 
much in the way of guidelines as to jurisdiction in annulment 
proceedings. Apparently domicile of plaintiff will suffice, 
and the court may (or may not, in its discretion) entertain the 
action if it has personal jurisdiction over both nondomiciliary 
parties. 
18. 67 Cal.2d at 674, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 20. 67 Cal.2d at 676, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 
295, 432 P.2d at 982. 297, 432 P.2d at 984. 
19. 67 Cal.2d at 676, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 
296, 432 P.2d at 983. 
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Presumptions and the Evidence Code1 
On January 1, 1967, presumptions ceased to be evidence 
in California.2 Under the new law, presumptions are of two 
distinct kinds, and have very different effects. Every pre-
sumption is either (1) a presumption affecting the burden of 
producing evidence, or (2) a presumption affecting the bur-
den of proof.3 What will be the status of the various statutory 
and non-statutory presumptions which play such an important 
part in the field of community property? The Evidence Code 
specifies a number of presumptions as belonging in one class 
or the other,4 but community property is not mentioned. In 
the absence of further legislation, it will be the task of the 
courts to apply the criteria set forth in the Evidence Code 
and to add unclassified presumptions to the classified list. 
Perhaps the most important presumption applied in the 
community property cases is the general non-statutory pre-
sumption, arising from the statutory definitions of separate 
and community property, that property acquired during mar-
riage is community property: The presumption is one of 
fact and is rebuttable, but the cases have uniformly held that 
it requires a holding that an acquisition is community prop-
erty in the absence of rebutting evidence.6 In the presence 
of such evidence, the inference from acquisition during mar-
riage is weighed against the rebuttal evidence. The presump-
tion has been referred to as "fundamental to the community 
property system."7 Is this now a presumption affecting the 
burden of proof, or merely one affecting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence? 
Reference to the Evidence Code gives these guidelines: (1) 
a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is 
one established to implement no public policy other than to 
facilitate the determination of the particular action in which 
1. For further analysis see Degnan, honey, 71 Cal. App.2d 65, 161 P.2d 
EVIDENCE in this volume. 944 (1945). 
2. Cal. Evid. Code § 600(a). 6. See, e.g., Fountain v. Maxim, 210 
3. Cal. Evid. Code § 601. Cal. 48, 290 P. 576 (1930); Estate of 
4. See generally, Cal. Evid. Code §§ Jolly, 196 Cal. 547, 238 P. 353 (1925). 
630-668. 7. Estate of Duncan, 9 Cal.2d 207, 
5. Fidelity &. Casualty Co. v. Ma- 70 P.2d 174 (1937). 
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the presumption is applied;8 (2) a presumption affecting the 
burden of proof is one based on implementation of a public 
policy.9 In the light of these provisions, it would seem that 
the general community property presumption is one affecting 
the burden of proof. The status of other community property 
presumptions, such as the specific statutory presumption as 
to property acquired by a married woman by an instrument in 
writing, is less clear. 
8. Cal. Evid. Code § 603. 9. Cal. Evid. Code § 605. 
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